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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, a debate has emerged on the issue of accountability in the EU. 
Additionally, it is interesting to look at the accountability situation of certain policy areas. 
Cohesion Policy is an important policy field, because it involves one third of the EU budget in 
the form of the Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds and is touching upon a lot of other 
policy areas, such as employment, social affairs, transport and research and innovation. It 
gives member states (MS’s) for these policy areas financial resources in the pursuit of 
improvements in these areas. It is therefore also interesting to look at the accountability 
situation of Cohesion Policy.  
 
As part of a dissertation research (Damen - Koedijk, forthcoming) an analytical framework on 
the concept of ‘good accountability’ has been developed that will briefly be outlined here. 
The main focus of the paper is the application of this framework on the Dutch situation of 
regional ERDF OP’s in the 2007-2013 period. However, this framework will also offer 
possibilities to compare the Dutch situation to that of other MS’s. 
 
In paragraph 2, the analytical framework of ‘good accountability’ will be elaborated, 
followed by three (accountability) relationships on the European and national level that are 
identified in Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands in paragraph 3. We will discuss two 
developments in the 2014-2020 period related to accountability in paragraph 4, followed by 
the conclusions in paragraph 5.  
 
2. Analytical framework of ‘good accountability’ 
We have formulated four requirements that, following the identification of actors and 
accountability relationships, will enable us to form an opinion of the situation of 
accountability. These requirements are related to coverage, context, content and costs. 
 
1. Coverage: accountability relationships on all levels 
The basic premise of the idea of good accountability, is that there is the existence of 
accountability relationships within the system. Without these relationships visible on all 
levels -  European, national and regional level - in the system, there can be no situation of 
good accountability. We classify the relationships between the actors within the policy area 
according to the four components as mentioned by Bovens (Bovens, 2007), which are: 
a) assignment of responsibilities, 
b) reporting by the agent, 
c) information seeking or investigating and also verification by the principal, and 
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d) direction or control by the principal, possibly posing sanctions on the agent.   
 
2. Context: elements of transparency, democracy and legal constraint 
As derived from academic literature (Fisher, 2004, Mulgan, 2003, Willems and Dooren, 
2012), three important elements of accountability are transparency, democracy and legal 
constraint. These elements give some sort of counterweight to single accountability 
(principal-agent) relationships and therefore can be seen as an essential element of good 
accountability.  
Without transparency it will not be possible for actors to hold an agent really to account. 
Transparency brings information into the open and makes it possible for (other) actors to 
hold an agent to account.  
Elections give a pressure on actors subject to these elections, knowing they can be voted 
away by voters. Since elected actors also have a role in the policy area of Cohesion Policy, we 
also expect pressure from this democratic element, although in practice this might be 
limited. 
Finally, also legal constraint plays a role in good accountability. The function of legal 
constraint is (also) a counterbalance to the principal-agent relationship, in the way that 
there is another actor that has a possibility to rule in a certain case and can have an 
influence on the accountability relationship concerned. In the system as a whole in a 
situation of good accountability, we consider there should be a role for legal actors to also, 
next to transparency and democracy, provide a counterweight in a single accountability 
relationship. 
 
3. Content: economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The third requirement points at the object of an accountability relationship, thus at the 
policy process chain, or ‘the 3 E’s’. It should not (solely) be about the process (compliance), 
but actually also on the elements of the policy process chain, on economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. On all levels in the system one of these three elements should be visible, to 
have all levels connected in the accountability chain of the policy area.  
 
4. Costs: absence of accountability deficit or overload 
Finally, the last precondition is directed at the extremes of an accountability situation: it 
should be balanced, in the way there is no situation of accountability deficit or overload.  
This mainly relates to the cost aspect of an accountability situation.  
This means in the first place that the mechanisms used by the principal to influence the 
agent should match the shirking risk of the latter. As the preferences of both actors diverge, 
this risk will be higher. Thus in a situation of good accountability, there is a balance between 
both the mechanisms used by the principal and the shirking-risk of the agent.   
Secondly, a downwards spiral in monitoring and bonding costs, born by respectively the 
agent and the principal (Groenendijk, 1997), should be absent. 
Finally, explicit elements that indicate a situation of accountability overload (Bovens et al., 
2008) should be absent. These elements are visible when a regime:  
a. imposes extraordinarily high demands on the agent’s limited time and energy,  
b. contains a comparatively large number of mutually contradictory evaluation criteria 
for the agent, 
c. contains performance standards that extend way beyond their own and comparable 
authorities’ good practices, 
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d. contains performance standards that seem particularly conducive to goal 
displacement or subversive behavior. 
 
We will now look at the accountability situation of Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands to see 
whether these requirements are met.  
 
3. Accountability relationships in Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands 
We have drafted a figure with all actors and accountability relationships (straight lines) and 
other relationships (dotted or dashed lines), see below. In this paper we will look at the 
relationships in the red circle.
2
   
 
Figure 1. All actors and relationships in Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands 
 
I. MS (agent) and European Commission (EC, principal) 
Coverage: is there an accountability relationship? 
Within the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU specific provisions are set on the relationship 
between the EC and the MS, in this case with the MS acting as agent in the implementation 
of policies of the EU. The EC is for a lot of policy areas dependant on the MS’s executing 
them. In fact, especially the principle of shared management
3
 is an expression of this, 
leading to cooperation and shared responsibilities between the EC and the MS’s in the 
implementation. Since the governments are responsible for policy execution on national 
level, this leads to a relationship between the EC as principal on the one hand and the 
national governments as agents on the other. Although the Regulation mentions obligations 
for the MS’s as well as for the management authority (MA), it gets clear that the MS is the 
responsible actor for the implementation on national and regional level. This is also laid 
down in the Financial Regulation (FR).
4
    
More specifically on Cohesion Policy, the Regulation is peppered with specific obligations of 
the MA’s to inform the EC on. This means the first and second step of accountability, 
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assignment of responsibilities and reporting by the agent, are met. The third step, 
information seeking and verification by the principal, is also met in the situation of Cohesion 
Policy. The Directorate Generals (DG’s) concerned investigate the information reported by 
the MS’s, analyze it and form an opinion on the issue concerned.  
Finally, the analysis of the Regulation shows that the EC also has the possibility to pose 
sanctions. In the ex-ante phase, the EC has to adopt the national strategic reference 
frameworks and the OP’s. But, since these are all measures in the ex ante stage, leading to a 
postponement of the start of a programme, it is especially interesting to look at measures 
the EC has during the implementation phase. In this respect, article 92 and 99 of the 
Regulation are important, giving the EC the possibility to respectively interrupt or suspend 
payments to an OP, or pose financial corrections. Although the MA is directly affected by 
such a decision, these are directed at the MS.  
 
Context: elements of transparency, democracy and legal constraint 
Regarding transparency, we can see that the situation has improved since the 2007-2014 
period. Communication between the MS and the EC on Cohesion Policy is in general not 
made publicly available by either of the two parties. The EC however does publish 
information on its activities and the performance of the MS’s in its Annual Activity Report 
(AAR) (European Commission, 2014a). These are published since 2010 and with the years 
have been more open on the performance of specific MS’s. The EC also publishes its yearly 
Synthesis report (European Commission, 2014b).  
When looking at the Netherlands, we see that the national government promotes 
transparency with the publishing of the national Declaration of Assurance (DAS) and the 
accompanying report issued by the Dutch Court of Auditors, the Algemene Rekenkamer 
(AR). However, the Annual Summary that is send to the EC has only been published in 2012 
as an exception (Algemene Rekenkamer, Forthcoming, 2015).  
Regarding legal constraint, there is the possibility for both the MS and the EC to start a case 
before the European Court of Justice. This means that there is legal protection possible for 
both actors.  
 
Content: economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
When looking at the nature of this accountability relationship, we see that the focus is on 
compliance elements, or elements of financial management, thus related to the aspect of 
‘economy’. MS’s have to comply with the compliance requirements of the EC, leading to 
reports, reinforced correction and suspension procedures, MS action plans and its follow-up, 
increased scale and intensity of audits and more rigorous closure procedures (Mendez and 
Bachtler, 2011). Efficiency is not an issue in this relationship, there is no obligation for the 
MS to inform the EC on efficiency issues. Regarding effectiveness we can see in the 
regulation there is attention for effectiveness in the ex ante stage.
5
 During the 
implementation stage the MS’s have to send in a report twice to the EC informing it on the 
achievement of the objectives of Cohesion Policy, which partly deals with effectiveness.
6
 The 
EC is using the information provided by the MS’s in its yearly Cohesion report. Evaluation is 
the main source of information for the effectiveness of the policy. The EC obliges the MS’s to 
perform an ex ante evaluation
7
 and also to evaluate during the implementation stage.
8
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To summarize, we see some attention for effectiveness of the policy concerned in this 
relationship between the MS and the EC, but the main focus of this relationship is put on 
compliance and economy issues.  
 
Costs: absence of accountability deficit or overload 
The preferences between the national government and the EC are expected to be in general 
more divergent than convergent, probably also depending on the MS concerned. The 
Netherlands for instance, is known to attach importance to accountability of the use of EU 
funds, whereas other MS’s might attach less importance to this subject. The EC is 
representing the EU and thus promoting a fair use and accountability of the use of the funds 
in all MS’s, whereas the MS’s will always start looking at what a specific measure means for 
the MS itself. An example of this divergence between EC and the MS is the earlier mentioned 
N+2 rule.
9
 This gives the MS’s an incentive to spend these funds, whether this spending is 
(exactly) according to the EU rules or not.  
Regarding the mechanisms used, as mentioned beforehand, the EC has quite strong 
mechanisms in hand to influence the actions of the MS and also the MA, formed by the 
needed approval of the OP by the EC, the possibility to suspend payments and impose 
financial corrections. The fact that the EC has strong mechanisms matches the shirking risk 
of the MS’s, which can be described as rather high. 
Looking at the signs of a downwards spiral of costs between the principal and agent, we do 
not see these. Finally, when focusing on the characteristics mentioned by Bovens, we see 
these are also absent. 
 
II. MA (agent) and MS (principal) 
Coverage: is there an accountability relationship? 
The relationships on ERDF in the Netherlands are set between the MA at the regional level 
and the ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ),
10
 representing the MS, on the national level.  
The assignment of the MA is laid down in ‘Besluit EFRO programmaperiode 2007-2013,’
11
   
but specific relationships between all actors on national and regional level have been laid 
down in an agreement (‘convenant’).
12
 This agreement mentions the obligations of the 
MA,
13
 the CA
14
 and the AA.
15
 In the articles 12 until 24 the obligations of the minister, and in 
fact of the ministry of EZ, are mentioned, which focuses on the tasks of the ministry in cases 
of incorrect use of funds and in sending information to the EC.  
 
When we look at the specific elements of an accountability relationship, it is clear that the 
first two elements, assignment of responsibilities and reporting obligations, are present. 
Both the national legislation
16
 and the agreement mentioned above, point at specific 
responsibilities that are assigned to the MA and what the MA should report on to EZ. 
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However, this reporting is not directly aimed at the ministry, but at the EC. The ministry is 
therefore not assessing the information itself, other than checking whether the information 
asked by the EC is complete and seems correct. The last element is present, but in a more or 
less implicit form. The MS has the obligation to prevent irregularities and fraud.
17
 In case of 
irregularities the MS has the possibility to pose sanctions onto an MA to prevent this. 
Although this also follows from the Regulation,
18
 this has also been laid down in national 
legislation in the Nerpe law,
19
  which is also applicable to Cohesion Policy in the 
Netherlands.
20
 However, this possibility will in practice only be used in the case where 
European institutions, for instance the EC, order the reclaim if misused funds. Although the 
possibility exists for the MS (in this case the ministry of EZ) to make financial corrections to 
an OP, it is only a hypothetical possibility. It will in practice only be used when the MS is 
accused by a European institution.  
Also important to note in this respect is that the minister cannot retract the assignment as 
MA, CA or AA.  
 
This shows that the relationship between the MS and the MA in the Netherlands does not 
show all elements of an accountability relationship. Instead, the ministry - and thus the MS -  
can be seen as some sort of ‘service-hatch’ for information being send from the MA or MS 
towards the EC, and backwards in the case of sanctions posed by the EC.   
 
Because we do not classify this relationship as an accountability relationship, we will not 
discuss the other three requirements. 
 
III. MA  (agent) and EC (principal) 
Coverage: is there an accountability relationship? 
When looking at the Regulation, it gets clear that the formal relationship in implementing 
the Structural Funds is set between the EC on the one hand and the MS on the other.
21
 
However, when the Regulation discusses executing issues, it no longer speaks of ‘the 
member state’, but instead it refers to ‘the member state or the management authority’
22
 or 
sometimes even directly of ‘the management authority.’
23
  At the same time, in article 67 
paragraph 4, it says that the EC will inform the MS on its opinion on the annual reports of 
the MA, while article 68 mentions that ‘the Commission and the managing authority shall 
examine the progress made in implementing the operational programme.’
24
 This shows that 
the relationship between the EC, MS and MA is in fact a triangular one: formally, there is a 
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direct accountability relationship between the EC as a principal and the MS as an agent, but 
there is also a relationship between the EC and the MA, that encompasses the MS as well. 
  
When looking at the four elements of an accountability relationship, it starts with the 
assignment of responsibilities of the agent. These are set in article 60 of Regulation 
1083/2006. Reporting obligations, the second element, are also present, the regulation also 
mentions various issues the MA should inform the EC on.
25
 When having received this 
information, the EC also has to verify it and form an opinion on it, leading to direction or 
control and possibly to sanctions. Since the sanctioning mechanisms are directed at the MS, 
but having direct effect on the OP and thus on the MA, the relationship formally runs from 
the MA via the MS to the EC.  
 
In the Netherlands, the Audit Authority (AA) also has a substantial role in this process. 
Following the Regulation, the AA has an advisory role to the EC in verifying by audits 
whether the management and control system of the OP functions effectively.
26
 This means 
they have an independent role to provide the EC as principal with information on the 
performance of the MA as agent.  However, in practice, it is said that findings of the AA will 
have to lead to corrections that need to be included in the ACR. In its role as verification 
agency to the EC, one would expect that the EC as principal poses sanctions, not the AA. In 
reality, the AA has been given the authority to pose sanctions, instead of the EC. This means 
the relationship between MA and AA is somewhat blurred, not showing signs of the first 
three elements of an accountability relationship, but where the fourth elements of posing 
sanctions is present.  
Also, there are detailed discussions between MA’s and the AA in the Netherlands on the 
verification standards. Since the (European and national) regulations are not clear on all 
obligations, there are cases where the MA’s have approved certain costs of beneficiaries and 
the AA has considered these as errors and mentioned these in its ACR. It is questionable 
whether these errors mentioned by the AA are real errors and should be corrected, it should 
be the EC as principal to decide on such issues. However, these are dealt with in the 
adversarial procedure between MA and AA and seem not to reach the EC.  
 
Context: elements of transparency, democracy and legal constraint 
As we have mentioned earlier, DG REGIO of the EC, responsible for Cohesion Policy, is issuing 
an AAR (European Commission, 2014a) on its activities and the performance of the MS’s in 
implementing the policy. At the same time MA’s also inform both the EC and the public on 
their performance.
27
 However, other information on discussions with the EC or the ACR 
issued by the AA is not made publicly available.  
 
The element of legal constraint is also directed via the MS, there is no possibility for the MA 
to appeal against a decision of the EC. The MS, however, can go into appeal. This means that 
also in judicial aspect, the relationship between the EC and the MA is running via the MS. 
But, since the preferences of the MA and MS might differ, this means that a possibility for a 
legal procedure is limited for the MA. 
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Content: economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
When looking at the nature of this accountability relationship, we can see that this is directly 
aimed at compliance and economy. All the issues the MA has to inform the EC on are 
connected to compliance elements, instead on performance elements. The EC is primarily 
interested in money spend, error rates and financial aspects of the programme, although the 
MA also needs to inform the EC on the progress made with the performance indicators of 
the programme. On not reaching these indicators no sanctions are set,
28
 while there are 
financial sanctioning instruments set on the compliance elements mentioned above.
29
 
Moreover, these performance indicators itself do not directly refer to effectiveness of the 
policy, it is only informing about the output of the policy. Efficiency moreover is not to be 
reported on by the MA. 
 
Costs: absence of accountability deficit or overload 
There are divergent tensions in the implementation of Cohesion Policy between both actors. 
This is originated in the fact that OP’s are often governed by local authorities, where also 
local interests may play a role. Since these might be contradictory to the interests of the EU 
and EC, for instance in awarding a grant to a project that is important to a region but that 
does not fit perfectly in the goals of the EU, we consider there is tendency to divergence in 
this relationship. We have described previously that the EC has strong mechanisms to 
influence the actions of the MS and also the MA. These strong mechanisms then match the 
(possible) shirking risk of the MA’s.   
 
When looking at aspects that might play a role in a downwards spiral of accountability, we 
notice that with each programming period the demands on the MA’s get higher. In the 2000-
2006 period the thresholds for management verifications and checks on the spot were lower 
and since the 2007-2013 period the threshold of 2% has been introduced. In the 2000-2006 
period in the Netherlands the MA’s had assigned an external auditor for the verification of 
checks by the MA, currently the role of the AA. Furthermore, the function of certification 
was executed within the MA. Since the 2007-2013 period separate institutions for CA (Dienst 
Regelingen of the ministry of EZ) and AA (Audit Dienst Rijk) have been appointed in the 
Netherlands, thereby also heavying the institutionalization of controls. As we will describe in 
the following paragraph, the burden is further aggravated in the new period with also 
obligations on reporting on the performance of the policy. Concluding, we do see over time 
signs in this relationship of a downwards spiral of accountability. 
 
Finally, when looking at the aspects of accountability overload as mentioned by Bovens, we 
can see three of the four aspects in this relationship.  
First, we consider that the demands on the management authorities are very high. The 
obligations that are set on management verifications, reporting obligations in the annual 
report, verification of the work of the MA by the AA and reporting of irregularities to the EC 
take a lot of time of the MA. It can be questioned whether these obligations really 
contribute to a good execution of the programme, that will probably also be the case 
without these heavy reporting obligations.  
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Secondly, the performance standards are quite high. With a maximum error rate of 2% the 
threshold of good governance is quite low. It is questioned whether this is realistic in shared 
management.  
Third, we can also see goal displacement in the governance of the programmes. Especially 
when looking at the 2014-2020 programme, with more emphasis on effectiveness of the 
policy, it is expected that MA’s will invest more in governance of the effectiveness of the 
policy. Since the money available for the 2014-2020 period has declined in the 
Netherlands,
30
 it will mean that capacity will be shifted from other priorities to effectiveness. 
This implies there will be less attention for other areas, such as compliance or economy. It 
can be questioned whether this is a positive shift. 
 
4. The 2014-2020 period 
In this paragraph we will highlight two aspects to accountability in the new programming 
period.  
 
Performance reserve 
In the 2014-2020 period, the performance reserve, that was mentioned in the 2007-2013 
regulation as a voluntary instrument for the MS, is set as an obligation.
31
 In total 6% of the 
resources allocated to the ESI funds
32
 are put into the performance reserve for every OP, 
and allocated to specific priorities. In 2019, the EC will take a ‘performance review’, together 
with the MS, ‘to examine the achievement of the milestones of the programmes at the level 
of priorities.’
33
 This means the performance reserve has turned obligatory, and MA’s have to 
set specific milestones in their OP to be achieved halfway the programme. Following the 
pressure for more focus towards performance of Cohesion Policy, the EC has introduced this 
instrument as an important step forward (European Commission, 2013). One would expect 
that not achieving these halfway milestones will lead to the loss of this performance reserve 
of 6%, thus leading to an extra sanctioning mechanism available for the EC. When looking 
more closely, it gets clear however that this instrument is not as harsh as it possibly could 
work. In case a programme has not reached its milestones, it has the possibility to ‘propose 
the reallocation of the corresponding amount of the performance reserve to [other] priorities 
[…] and other amendments to the programme which result from the reallocation of the 
performance reserve.’
34
  
This shows that there is more focus on performance elements, but the sanctions that are 
placed are not as harsh as they seem. First, MA’s have the possibility to agree with the EC on 
allocation of the performance reserve, even when the OP has not achieved its milestones. 
Secondly, it is expected that the MA’s will anticipate on these milestones that are set in the 
OP, trying to make them as realistic – and maybe even easy to reach- as possible. We will 
therefore have to see in the future whether this adaptation will have the effect it is 
supposed to have and will lead to more focus on the performance of Cohesion Policy.   
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National declaration (DAS) 
The Dutch minister of Finance issues a yearly Declaration of Assurance (‘Lidstaatverklaring’) 
since 2006, on a voluntary basis and based on partial statements by the ministries 
responsible. This declaration is covering all expenditure that is done by the Dutch 
government with money coming from the EU. The DAS is accompanied by a report of the AR 
(Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014).
35
 On 2013, only three MS’s have issued such a declaration 
besides the Netherlands: Sweden and Denmark. The Dutch government has been lobbying 
to get the DAS as an obligatory element of the accountability of EU money. However, in the 
Financial Regulation that is renewed in 2012, it is still only mentioned as a voluntary 
instrument.
36
 However, both the EP and the EC support the use of this instrument, following 
an advice of the ‘Working group on National Declarations’ (European Commission, 2014c).
37
 
For a good accountability situation, it is important that the politically responsible actors also 
take their responsibility and this instrument serves this purpose. The future will show 
whether this instrument will become mandatory, since there is opposition to this instrument 
of a lot of MS’s.   
 
5. Conclusions 
As we have seen from the relationships mentioned in this paper, there are still some 
deficiencies in the Dutch (regional) ERDF situation. We have summarized them in the table 
below. 
 
Table 1. Summary of findings on accountability requirements in Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands 
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Requirements on good 
accountability (normative) Summary of findings
requirement
fulfilled?
C
O
V
E
R
A
G
E 1. On all levels (EU, national, 
regional) an actor should be 
included in an accountability 
relationship
We have seen that relationships on all 
levels are present
√
C
O
N
T
E
X
T 2. The elements of transparency, 
democracy and legal constraint 
should be visible and present 
within the system
Transparancy is sufficient, has already 
improved. 
Element of democracy is visible in 
relationships with the public, with 
elected representatives. Is sufficient.
Legal possibilities are lacking for MA's. 
+/-
C
O
N
T
E
N
T
3. The elements of the policy 
process chain, economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness , 
should be visible somewhere 
within the system
Mainly on compliance and economy. 
Attention for effectiveness is growing in 
2014-2020, but still limited and effects 
should be awaited. Attention for 
efficiency is lacking. 
- 
C
O
S
T
S
5. There should be no situation of 
accountability deficit or overload, 
in the way that mechanisms used 
by the principal should match the 
shirking risk of the agent and a 
downwards spiral in higher 
monitoring and bonding costs 
should be absent. Also, the four 
elements of accountability 
overload should be absent.
In all discussed relationships, 
mechanisms match the shirking risk. 
However, a downwards spiral can be seen 
in the relationship between MA and EC, 
also in relation to the AA in the 
Netherlands. 
Also, in this lastly mentioned 
relationship, we see three elements of 
accuontability overload, as mentioned by 
Bovens. 
-
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We consider that the first requirement on accountability relationships is met. Regarding the 
second requirement, we consider the elements of transparency and democracy are 
sufficiently present. However, on legal constraint, we consider that legal opportunities for 
MA’s are limited in the relationship with the EC. This is because of the triangular relationship 
between the MA, MS and EC, where the MS is acting for a major part as ‘service hatch’ for 
information flows between the EC and MA. It is important that there is also attention for the 
legal possibilities for the MA’s.  
Regarding the third requirement on the policy process chain, we see that there is no 
attention for efficiency in Cohesion Policy. This should not be neglected since efficiency 
stands for efficient use of resources, which is also important in accountability of the use of 
European taxpayers’ money. Attention for effectiveness, as we have described, is growing 
with the obligated use of the performance reserve in the 2014-2020 period, but the proof of 
the pudding will be in the eating.  
Finally, when looking at the elements of accountability overload, we have seen in the 
relationship between MA and EC that some of these elements are present. This is specifically 
related to the blurred role between EC, AA and MA. It is important to start discussions on 
these elements, to make sure that these examples of accountability overload disappear in 
the coming years.  
Further research will have to show whether the situation of accountability in the case of 
Cohesion Policy in the Netherlands is unique, or that other MS’s suffer the same problems.   
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